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IN THE
SUPRE!1E COURT OF THE
STATE OF UTAH

LEERCO, a Partnership,
Plaintiff and
Respondent,
-vs-

Case No. 15925

BOISE CASCADE AND
SANFORD CORPORATION,
Defendants and
Appellants.
BRIEF OF RESPOnDENT
LEERCO

~lATURE

OF THE CASE

This is a product liability action under which
Respondent claims damages as a result of having used
appellant's product consistent with the labelling on the
product.

After doing so, Respondent claims that the

pro-

duct turned yellm.;r, damaging the items to which it vras
applied.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER

COL~T

The case was tried to a jury before the Third
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District Court of Salt Lake County, Utah.

The jury,

upon special interrogatories, rendered judgment for
respondent as prayed.
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
Respondent prays that the verdict of the jury
and the judgment entered by the Trial Court be affirmed.
STATEl1ENT Or THE FACTS
Respondent agrees with the statement of facts
contained in Appellant's brief with the exception of the
following:
1.

The next to last sentence of paragraph

one (1) of nage four (4) is argument, not fact.

Though

the testimony referenced by appellant was given, it was
clearly contradicted by respondent's president who
testified that (a) Leerco needed the original damaged
mosaics for updating (T.93)*, (b) that the damaged mosaics
were unsuitable for use in making new negatives, and
(c) that despite the most careful handling, the negatives
became damaged through use and need to be replaced (T.62-66).
2.

Paragraph one (1) of page five (5) is mis-

leading. At T. 78-9,

Leerco's president testified that

by use of Exxon billing records he became satisfied that

"T" designations refer to the transcript of proceedings.
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the yellow mosaics were created during the time Sanford,
rather than Best Test Cement was being used.
3.

The testimony of Sanford's vice president

concerning t"he "coverage" of the cement was given.

How-

ever, both logic and other testimony which the jury apparently believed, controvert what was said.

First,

his assertion that the addition of "thinner" does not
increase the volume is patently absurd.

Though that may

be true when the thinner is used to thin drying cement,
it w-ould not be true if thinner were used to thin down
the consistency of fresh cement.

Second, no tests were

performed

which involved use of

by either

defendant

a squeegy in insure only a minute quantity of cement
between the surfaces cemented as was done by Leero(T.85).
4.

The "testimony" of appellant's "photographic

experts" at page seven (7), is also something short of
a statement of fact

in light of Lindsay's testimony

that the yellov7 mosaics w·ould not produce usable negatives (T.83, 85, 86).
5.

The factual statements in paragraph two (2)

of page nine (9)

about "photographic yellowing" are all

well and good, but an examination of the Mosaics ~vhich
are in evidence make it perfectfully clear that it is
the Sanford's Cement itself which has turned color.
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6.

Respondent does not argue \vith the asser-

tions on pages nine (9) and ten (10) of appellant's brief
about the sterling general quality of appellant's product.
~vhat

cannot be controverted is that if one scrapes a

quantity of that product off the damaged mosaics in
evidence, it is not "transparent" and clear
and ugly.

but yellow

Examination of the mosaic's clearly shows that

the photos on them have been turned yellow by the cement.
ARGllHENT
For purposes of this argument, both appellant's
points will be treated as one.

And, though they are

phrased as legal niceties, both concern one question:
Did plaintiff-appellant put on a prima facie case which
was sufficient to support the verdict?
A.

It did.

It was "possible" for Sanford's Cement

to have caused the Hosaics to turn yellow.

Appellant

argues that this is impossible because only 3 1/2 gallons
of Sanford's r:ement was used by Leerco and "every single
witness, including Leerco's president, testified that
one gallon of Sanford's Rubber Cement would made seven
mosaics."

(There is no transcript reference to the

asserted evidence of Leerco's president).

The real basis

for this argument is the testimony of Sanford's vice president that one gallon would make seven mosaic's, and
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that of Pembroke's man 1r1ho ran tests in 1vhich one gallon
made six mosaics.

~espondent asserts that if these tests

and the testimony thereabout do not constitute the evidentiary equivalent of Genesis 1:1, then this argument
fails in light of the jurv's verdict.
tests are desoositive of nothing.

In fact, the

At T. 308-309 Francis

Gilbert, of Sanford, testified that one gallon of cement
covers about 60 to 80 square feet.

Nothing was estab-

lished as to the foundation of this assertion.

At

T. 333, et seq, Halter Chitty of Pembrokes states that
he personally ran some tests on coverage and that on plain
paoer, one quart covered 1 1/2 3 x 4 sheets for 18 square
feet which indicates a gallon would cover 72 square feet.
Nothing was established regarding the manner of apolication,

testure of the paper or thickness of application.

On the contrary, Leerco's president, in describing a
test on plaintiff's Exhibit 19, indicates the use of a
squeegy to get the air and excess cement out from bet1•'een the tHo surfaces glued together.

Common sense

indicates that this procedure would remove all but
the thinnest of films of the ceJ11ent; a far cry from
dabbling it on with a brush as one would usually do.
Undoubtedly, the amount of cement used vmuld be less than
1/3 the normal amount, especiallv if it was thinned.
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These tests proved nothing and the assertions about
coverage made by plaintiff's witnesses were properly
ignored by the jury.

The estimate of the cost of ce-

ment for each mosaic by Mr. Lindsay does not support
appellant's claim.
B.
cause.

The evidence clearly established proximate

Lindsay testified that the first yellow mosaics

were made "about when" they started using Sanford's
(T. 78) and that after they quit using it, the mosaics
quit turning yellow.

In order to test the theory of

causation Leerco spread Best Test on one side of paper
and Hylar and Sanford's adjacent to it.

Low and behold,

the product of the test, plaintiff's exhibit 19, shows
that the Sanford side turned yellow and the other did
not.

Surely, the jury cannot be criticized for basing

it's findings on causation on this utterly plain evidence.
As to the asserted violation of the label indications for the product, Mylar is an apparently inert
plastic.

Physical examination of the damaged mosaics

makes it fairly clear that the mylar did not cause the
yellow stains.

However, appellant makes the argument

here (at page 15) and made it to the jury, that photographic paper isn't included in the meaning of "paper"
as that term is used on Sanford's label.

The jury didn't

bu·t that argument and neither should this Court.

As the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-6-

special interrogatories make plain, the jury felt that
if the basic property of the item to which the cement
is applied is paper, the customer should have no obligation to separate among those v7hich are dyed, have ink
on them, have emulsions on the front or may be shaped
like party hats in determining which they can use this
cement on.

The can said

and was damaged.

~·

Leerco used it on

~~

It is entirely proper that appellant

pay for the damage.
C.

The case law.

Not one case cited by

appellant is relevant to this lawsuit because

most

relate to products applied to the skin, a matter

~ilhere

allergic people are best able to prevent the harm and
have properly been saddled with the responsibility of
doing so.

Here, we are not involved with exotic beauty

!)otients or things you put in your eyes.

He are talking

about one of the really mundane products in the world:
rubber cement.
different

It's label contains no hint that it is

from all other rubber cements or that it is

unsuitable for any purpose except eating it, rubbing
it on your skin or breathing it's fumes.
The only other case cited by appellant appears
to have been inserted to support it's redundant and unsupnorted claim that the yellowing ,.;as caused by impro-
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per photographic processing.

As indicated, this argu-

ment is rendered absurd by exhibit 19 on which one sheet
of photogranh was discolored by Sanford's and not by
another brand.

Cause and effect are clearly established

and Price v. Ashby's, Inc. is inapposite.
D.

The line of cases to which this Court's

attention should properly be drawn is that which establishes that jury verdicts ought not to be disturbed over
quixotic arguments as those presented by appellant in
it's brief here.
in many forms.

The Court has stated the same rule
Charlton v. Hackett, 360 P.2d 176, 11

U. 2d 389 (1961) holds that a jury "verdict must be sustained if 'substantially supported' by the record".

In

Owy-hee, Inc. v. Robbins l1arco Polo, 407 P.2d 565, 17
U.2d 181 (1965), we find that an appellant from averdiet must prove that his evidence was so clear, credible
and undisputed that all reasonable minds uould find
that his view of the facts and right to recovery has
been established.

Child v. Child, 332 P.2d 981, 8 U.2d

261 (1958) holds that appellant must show that there
is "no reasonable basis in the evidence on which the
trial court [jury] could have rationally thought that
the requisite degree of proof was met."
Furthermore, on appeal the verdict is accorded
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the benefit of every evidentiary and legal doubt.Wbite
v. Christensen, 550 P.2d 1289 (1976); Bezner v. Continental
Drv

~leaners,

Inc., 548 P.2d 898 (1976); Lee v. Howes,

548 P.2d 619 (1976); Bullock v. Ungritch, 538 P.2d 190
(1975); and Steele v. Wilkinson, 349 P.2d 1117, 10 U.2d
159 (1960).

This Court took an even more adamant view

when it held, in Hoggan & Hull & Higgins, Inc. v. Hall,
414 P.2d 89, 18 U.2d 3 (1966) that on an appeal from a
judgment for plaintiff, the evidence favorable to plaintiff must be considered to the exclusion of contrary
evidence.
These rules were succinctly stated in tandem
in Marks v. Continental Casualty Co., 427 P.2d 387,
19 U. 2d ll9 (1967) Hhere this Court held that a reviewing court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the trial court's findings and will not disturb
them if there is a reasonable basis in the evidence to
sustain them.
A similar rule has uniformly been held to apply to motions for directed verdict.

In this case, the

rule would apply both to defendant's motion for directed
verdict and for judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
In Rhines v. Dansie, 472 P.2d 428, 24 U.2d 375 (1970)
this Court stated the following rule:
[Granting defendant's motion for dir-
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~cted ver~ict] 11as tantamount to grant-

~n8 a mot~on for a non-suit, and >~e
must reverse the ruling if the evidence
was such that reasonable men could arrive at a different conclusion.

Citing Merrill v. Oregon Short Line Railroad, 81 p 85,
29 U 2641.

Accord, Anderson v. Gribble, 513 P.2d 432,

30 U.2d 68 (1973).

About the lav1, therefor, there is

no substantial question.
That the plaintiff-respondent met it's evidentiarv burden in all respects is sho\•m without resort
to the testimony.

An examination of the physical exhibits

makes the facts plain.

A look at Mosaic exhibits which

James Lindsay testified were made by Leerco prior to
the use of Sanford's cement shows that but for slight
discoloration around the edges, they are without flav1.
On the contrary, mosaic exhibits produced while Sanford's
was in use are in various stages of discoloration.

If

one will (as was done by counsel before the jury and
likely by the jury itself) scrape a small amount of the
cement itself off the discolored exhibits, it will be
plain to see that the Sanford's cement itself has discolored and discolored the photographs to which it has
been applied.

Similarly, such an exmination will show

that a reasonable man could conclude that the mylar plastic had no effect on the cement.

Such examination will
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also show that a reasonable man could conclude that the
"yellmving" react"_on occurred within the cement itself
or by the relationship with the paper used in the developed photographs.

From this, the jury concluded

that the cement was the proximate cause of the discoloration (See special interrogatory No. 2).

Special

interrogatories number 3, 5 and 9 show plainly that the
jury believed that respondent did not assume negligent
in any way in it's use of appellant's product.

Never-

theless, special interrogatory Number 8 indicates that
the jury believes Leero "misused" the product by using
it in a manner vJhich could not reasonably be for seen by
appellant.

The other special interrogatories plainly

resolve any possible inconsistency here.

Interrogatory

number one (l) contains the general conclusion that
Sanford was negligent.

Interrogatory number seven (7)

shows the jury's belief that the cement performed in a
manner which breached the warranties and representations
stated on the label (Appendix to appellant's brief).
Read in tandem, it is plain that the jury believed that
the term "transparent" thereon coupled with use of the
generic and unrestricted '#ord "paper" in describing permissible use of the product, could lead a reasonable
man to conclude that he could put the cement on any
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kind of paper without having it's color affected.
is certainly nothing absurd about that.

There

Plaintiff's

exhibit 19 plainly shows that the cement did not meet
this warranty specification.

And, though the chemical

reason for the failure was not proven, the fact of the
failure has been proven beyond any doubt by that exhibit.
Now, appellant focuses on respondent's failure
to prove chemical causation.

Such proof is not required

under our laH once ulimate causation has been shown as
Has done here by Exhibit "19".

In Utah Coop. Association

v. Egbert Huderli Hog Farms, 550 P.2d 196 (1976) this
Court concerned itself with a claim by plaintiff that
hod feed purchased from defendant had contained Salmonella
bacteria which killed it's hogs.

The Court first held

that when defendant sold hog feed it ought to have reasonably expected it would be fed to hogs so as to saddle defendant with an implied warranty.

The same rat-

ionale applies here where defendant's label said you
could put the cement on paper.

The hog feed wasn't re-

stricted to Berkshires any more than this cement was restricted to use on plain Hhite bond.

"Hogs" are hogs:

"paper" is paper (including photographic paper).

Second,

the Court held that the evidence of the source of the infection didn't have to be proven to an absolute certainty
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so long as plaintiff adduced "substantial evidence" to
support the "likelihood" that the infection came from
the feed.

Similarly, in this case, though plaintiff

did not prove the exact chemical cause of the discoloration, the physical exhibits plainly show that the cement
is the "source" of the problem.
The issue of "causation"

>•laS

also addressed

in Christopher v. Larsen Ford, 557 P.2d 1009 (1976).
There, the '"arranty relied on 'vas a general statement
by a retailer of Hobile homes that the vehicle was fit

for it's intended use.

After having disposed of seller-

appellant's warranty arguments this court turned it's
attention to the seller's claim that plaintiff had failed
to show that defects cognizable under the warranty had
caused the performance deficiencies of which plaintiff
complained.

Plaintiff had called an expert who stated

his assessments of the defects and stated that they v;ere
the reasons the vehicle wasn't fit for it's intended
use.

In affirming the judgment, this Court simply said:
... Notwithstanding the defendant's
contentions with respect thereto,
the testimony of Mr. Haslam concerning the defects in the motor home,
coupled with his opinion that because
of those defects the vehicle did not
meet the just stated requirement [that
the motor home be fit for the "usual
and ordinary purpose it's intended use),
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provided a sufficient basis to justify permitting the jury to pass on
that issue.
In the instant case, the jury had appellant's statements about it's product in evidence (Appendix to appellant's brief).
warranty.

It found the statements to contain a

A substantial portion of Mr. Lindsay's testi-

mony constitutes his opinion that the Sanford's cement
caused the discoloration (T. 75-76, 79, 83-86, 350-1).
Under the ruling in Christopher, supra, that is enough
to take the issue to the jury.

The jury believed the

overwhelming persuasive evidence, both physical and testimonial, adduced by plaintiff-respondent.

It disbe-

lieved the inconsistent, speculative and often plainly
irrelevant proofs of defendant-appellant.

It thought-

fully ansv1ered special interrogatories which specify
the entirely proper basis of it's verdict in detail.
That is all the law requires.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, plaintiff-respondent
respectfully prays the Court to affirm the jury's verdict
and the judgment rendered thereon.
Dated this

~tb--day

of June, 1979.

204
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